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ON "SUBSTITUTE 
INTELLIGENCES" 
IN THE FORMATION 
OF ATHEISTIC IDEOLOGY 
E. B. F. MIDGLEY 
1. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MODERN A THEISM 
AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
GEORGE BERNANOS - in his novel Le Curé de Campagne - puts into the mouth of Monsieur le Curé the following: "Satan, in his unknowingness, goes 
against the course of life and exhausts himself in absurd terrifying attempts to remake 
in an opposite sense the whole plan of the creation." 
N ow Aristotle tells us that man is the weakest of ail intellectual beings. Thus it is 
not within the power of the hum an mind to imitate precisely the specifie manner in 
which the evil an gels vainly seek to resist and revoit against the eternal order. 
Nevertheless, in carrying the modernist quarre! with the eternal order to the point of 
a definitive denial of God's existence, the modern atheistic revoit, when really 
understood and fully intended, would seem to approximate, about as c1ose!y as the 
mere human wayfarer can, to the revoit of the evil ange!s. Consequently, it is not 
surprising to find that, in modern atheism, the human mind aspires to revoit by the 
exercise of powers supposedly more than human. 
Yet, if modern atheism has a quasi-demonic aspect, if it lusts after the emergence 
of the superman, it also has an aspect which is sufficiently banal. Aristotle tells us 
that human nature is in many ways enslaved. In revolting irrationally against the 
human condition, the modernist intellectual enterprise has taken as its point of 
departure a certain acquiescence in intellectual and moral mediocrity. It has taken for 
granted those average products - intellectual and moral - which are occasioned 
(not caused) by the misfortunes of the human condition. For example, we find Hume 
to be preoccupied not with wisdom but with mere experience; not with man's highest 
activities but primarily with his o rdinary , average, uncultivated, and even his 
primitive, savage and rude performances.' These debased performances presuppose 
1. E.B.F. MIDGLEY: The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations. London/l\ew 
York, 1975, Chapter 6. III (David Hume). 
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the disordered operation of the more obvious and mundane powers of human nature 
rather than the right operation of any higher principles of human nature. So human 
powers come to be viewed largely as if man were sub-human, as if human life itself, in 
any really recognisable sense, had to be largely produced by human invention and 
artifice. Hume's "artificial virtue" and his view of political authority as a human 
device are illustrations of this. 
Accordingly, the modernist intellectual enterprise of recent centuries has failed 
to uphold the metaphysics of being, a true ontology or an intelligible philosophy of 
man. In losing the truth about human nature, it has put modern atheism in the 
position in which it cannot sustain a true humanism. Thus we shaH see that modern 
atheism tends - consciously or not - to conc\ude to a pseudo-humanism which is 
eventually seen to have involved the non-existence of man. But even the eventual 
realization of the supposed disappearance of man is not the end of the story. The 
purported demolition of man, Iike the decapitation of the hydra, is succeeded by the 
emergence of two monstrosities which had for long sought to substitute themselves 
for every intelligence - human or otherwise - whose existence had previously been 
known. 
One of these monstrosities is a disordered version of the "substitute intelligence 
of nature" which Aristotle rightly attributes to the operations of non-rational 
animais but which modern atheism misattributes to man himself.2 The other of these 
monstrosities is a supposed substitute intelligence of the superman. This consists in a 
vain misguided attempt by the rebellious human intellect to act as if it were 
competent to attempt the usurpation of the intellectual powers not merely of angels 
but even of God Himself. Thus, although modern atheism assimilates man to sub-
human nature and postulates that man is devoid of the hum an capacity to use right 
reason, it also aspires to the purported creation of a new man by the exercise of 
powers more than human. Indeed, the substitute intelligence of the superman 
purports to accomplish a contradictory transformation of man - an ontological 
transformation - which is logically impossible and which cou Id not, therefore, by 
done even by Omnipotence. 3 
The search for a synthesis or an identification of the two "substitute intelli-
gences" of modern atheism may be characterized as an opposing mirror-image of 
St. Augustine's somewhat ambiguous assimilation of the civitas terrena to the civitas 
diaboli. The civitas terrena embraces a disordered practice relating to earthly things 
whereby men pursue evil by acting in ways not truly human - as if man were 
somehow subhuman. The civitas diaboli envisages the communion of evil men and 
evil angels whereby men pursue evil in solidarity with intelligences more than human. 
In Augustine's perspective, the expression civitas terrena is used, not without 
ambiguity, to designate under one aspect the same solidarity in evil which is 
designated under another aspect as the civitas diaboli. 
In so far as atheistic ideology employs a "substitute intelligence of nature", it 
acts in behalf of a disordered practice which pertains, in Augustine's perspective, to 
2. C.N.R. McCay: The Structure of Political Thought, New York, 1963. 
3. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: Summa theologiae, l, q. 25, art. 3. 
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the civitas terrena. In 50 far as atheistic ideology employs a "substitute intelligence of 
the superman", it acts in behalf of a false and impossible merely human aspiration to 
pursue evil with an intelligence more than human, which pertains, in Augustine's 
perspective, to the civitas diaboli. Augustine's perspective reveals the depths of those 
evils, intellectual and moral, concealed in modern atheistic ideologies which are, in 
effect, grotesque transvaluations of his positions. 
Nevertheless, if we are to evaluate the evils of atheistic ideologies with greater 
precision, we must employ a critical perspective which corrects the eJement of 
ambiguity in Augustine's discussion of the civitas terrena by upholding a more 
coherent philosophy ofhuman nature. This was the historic task to which St. Thomas 
Aquinas set his hand. Let us therefore advert ta the Thomist account of the 
fundamental truth about reality - a reality upon which the modern world and 
atheistic man depend for their very existence but against the fundamental truth of 
which modern atheism - knowingly or unknowingly - revolts. First, it is to be held 
that neither man nor the universe is a human invention and that neither is without an 
extrinsic cause. The human creature, like ail other created beings, belongs to a 
universe which is envisaged from eternity and created cum tempore by God. Man is 
envisaged with a basically stable human nature governed by a basically stable natural 
law. This means that there is a harmony (or "economy" as it is called) of the natural 
law in its various applications and homogeneous developments in ail the states and 
conditions of humanity.4 
The truth is also that man is by nature a religious animal and, since no truly 
natural desire is in vain, there must be a true religion. Yet the true religion is found to 
be not sim ply natural but revealed and supernatural. And there is a harmony (or 
"economy" as it is called) of divine revelation in ail its various manifestations and 
homogeneous deveJopments which are basically one in ail the states and conditions 
of humanity. Finally, since the Author of creation and the Author of reveJation is one 
and the sa me God, there is a harmony, or "economy", of the two economies, 
deriving from the eternal law whereby God governs the entire universe of things 
including man. 5 
In misperceiving these truths and realities and responding irrationally to them, 
modern atheism employs "substitute intelligences" in undertaking a kind of implicit 
admission of, a revoit against, and a substitution for, natural and supernatural truth 
and reality. This undertaking is radically ideological in character. The modcrnist 
scepticism of Hume and others had already denied that there can be any philoso-
phically true reason for acting for any particular end and this inevitably occasioned 
the substitution of ideology for philosophy. The denial of right reason had left people 
only to misuse their reason as the slave of their feelings "in order to construct a world 
in idea to satisfy sorne practical purpose." 6 In doing this they became ideologists and 
not philosophers. 
4. C. JOURNET: "L'économie de la loi de nature". Revue Thomiste. 1961, pages 325-351 and 498-521. 
5. MIDGLEY, op. cit., Chapter 1. IV and "Natural Law and Fundamenta! Rights". Amairan Journal 
of Jurisprudence, vol. 21, 1976. pages 144-155. 
6. W.O. MARTIN: Metaphysics and [dea/ogy, Milwaukee, 1959. page 72. 
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Certainly, atheistic "scientism", based upon the "substitute intelligence of 
nature", is ideologicaUy motivated in the sense we are considering. It commonly 
supports that debased practice which is taken for granted, in a certain way, by 
modern atheism. St. Thomas Aquinas observes that concupiscence is, in a sense and 
to a degree, natural but that, sin ce the FaU, concupiscence also manifests the fomes of 
sin which regularly occasion the corn mon debased human practice of inordinate 
concupiscence. 7 Atheistic ideology commits itself, without good reason, to a 
"scientistic" acceptance of the "Iaw" of the fomes of sin as if it were a substitute in 
man for the natural law and for human nature itself. 
Yet modern atheism is not content sim ply to advance its "scientistic" law of 
human mediocrity. It further aspires irrationally to transform this mediocrity in 
which it has irrationally acquiesced.8 Accordingly, another ideological factor becomes 
operative in the form of a revoit against the entire human condition in which human 
nature is wounded but not put fundamentally out of order by original sin. This 
ideological revoit employs the "substitute intelligence of the superman". It proceeds 
as if human nature needed to be put right or re-invented - or, rather, invented, as it 
were, for the first time - by man. 
Accordingly, atheistic ideology fabricates a transvaluation which admits, revolts 
against and substitutes for, human nature, the economy of the naturallaw, as weil as 
the divine revelation and its economy. Ali this amounts to an attempted trans-
valuation of the eternallaw itself from which the two economies ultimately derive. In 
undertaking this prodigious enterprise, we shaH find that modern atheism is driven to 
seek a pseudo-perennial or pseudo-transcendent stance which is incompatible with its 
own radical rejection of everything that belongs to the transcendent, the perennial or 
the eternal. 
Although the two substitutes for right intelligence are found conjoined in the 
history of ideas in recent centuries, they do not emerge fully developed at the 
beginning of modernity. Let us therefore briefly examine the progressively more 
radical modernist subversion of, and substitution for, the economies of the eternal 
law, beginning with Machiavelli. 
II. THE PROXIMATE ORIGIN OF MODERN ATHEISM IN THE MODERNIST 
RECESSIONS FROM CLASSICAL/JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN TEACHING 
Machiavelli's revoit against c1assical and Judaeo-Christian philosophy is not 
propounded as a system. He begins not by finding the true morality and religion to be 
false but by regarding them as unserviceable. Certainly, there are pagan, heretical 
and potentially atheistic elements in Machiavelli. He covets the power to overcome 
fortune. He dreams that, if only we cou Id change our nature with time and 
circumstance, we should have fortune under our control. But Machiavelli does not 
7. ST. THOMAS AQUlNAS: Summa theologiae, la IIae, q. 91, art. 6 and q. 90, art. l, reply to obj. 1. 
8. A.M. PARENT: "Le Marxisme comme tentative de soustraire l'homme à la loi de la concupiscence 
déréglée, {ex fomitis", Sapientia Aquinatis, vol. II, Rome, 1956, pages 149-158. Cf. also MIDGLEY: 
"Authority, Alienation and Revoit", Aberdeen University Review, Autumn 1976, pages 372-383. 
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specifically undertake the re-creation of man or the invention of definitive substitutes 
for true morality and religion. The beginnings of such a deeper revoit are present only 
in germ. 
The graduai abandonment of the understanding of man as a real being is 
typically initiated in Machiavelli's account of the prince as a centaur - part man and 
part beast. Such a self-contradictory fiction is incompatible with the truth, unit y and 
reality of human nature in man. 9 Evidently but paradoxically, it postulates that there 
are in man sub-human parts which are manipulated by the supposedly human part 
according to modes of ca1culation which can no longer be characterized as truly and 
properly human. Machiavelli envisages the power of the sub-human parts of the 
centaur as having a certain autonomy which does not involve obedience to man's 
right reason. Logically, this postulated autonomy could only consist in what 
Aristotle calls the "substitute intelligence of nature" which governs the operations of 
beings that are not self-directed by rational intelligence. This "substitute intelligence" 
does not have the character of any created rational intelligence whatsoever. It is 
subject - remotely - only to the Uncreated rational Intelligence - the divine 
Intelligence concerned with the creation, disposition and government of ail created 
beings. Hence, in purporting to direct the sub-human parts of himself, the Machia-
vellian prince-centaur apparently seeks to act in a way which, in the end, could only 
be characterized as potentially a substitution for the divine ordering of the operations 
of non-rational animal natures. 
Unlike Machiavelli, who manifests the modernist revoit largely in potency, 
Hobbes will begin to bring what is in potency to act. Although paying !ip-service to a 
radically minimized morality and a bizarre presentation of Christianity, Hobbes 
advances a materialist philosophy which is evidently incompatible with true morality 
and true religion. On the basis of nominalism, he substantially eliminates the 
ciassical/ Judaeo-Christian perspectives upon human nature. He states that what is 
required is something ta take the place of a right reason which supposedly does not 
exist. 'o He also suggests that man is to man not so much a being specifically human 
but an arrant wolf and, at the same time, a kind of god. Hence the commonwealth is 
characterized as a mortal god whose sovereignty can determine what is just and what 
is unjust. The transvaluation of philosophy and theology has begun. 
The vestigial survival in Rousseau's work of a Iimited vocabulary on natural 
morality and the religion of man, cannot conceal the fact that Rousseau's man, 
however "noble", is presented as sub-human. Not unexpectedly, Rousseau's political 
"liberation" is sought specifically by changing human nature. The transvaluation of 
theology is evident. Bogus divine gifts are attributed to Rousseau's Legislator. The 
Rousseauian State itself seeks to usurp the authority of God as the Author of human 
nature. During the process in which man becomes a citizen, he is supposed to become 
a mere creature of the State as man is, in reality, a creature of God. The State is held 
competent to define a "civil religion". The infallibility divinely instituted in God's 
Church is fraudulently transferred to the General Will of the Rousseauian community. 
9. MIDGlTY: The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Re/allons. 01'. rit., Chapter 3 fi 
(Machiavellil. 
10. HORHI·.S: De eorpore poli/Ica, English Works, ed. Moleswonh, vol. IV, page 225. 
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Since the time of Rousseau, we find a regular recurrence of this strange 
combination: the purported diminishing of man to the status of a sub-human animal 
and an aspiration to achieve the transformation of man to the status of some kind of 
superman. The whole process involves the rejection of Aristotle's view that the 
subject of political philosophy is a being who is truly human and not either a beast or 
a god. Certainly, the substitution for man of the sub-human being and the superman 
characterizes a series of atheistic ideologies which involve an illicit extrapolation 
from, and distortion of, natural science and an illegitimate transvaluation of 
philosophy and theology. Hence modern atheism brings to a kind of consummation 
the historical conjoining of the errors of scientism and ideology.ll 
III. ATHEISM AND THE THREE ASPECTS OF IDEOLOGY 
The errors of modernity to which 1 have adverted are al ways - as human error 
needs must be - parasitic upon truth. Even radically ideological thinking, which 
formally repu dia tes truth as the end of the intellect, cannot avoid depending, to some 
extent, upon the truth which it repudiates. Modernism is always driven, consciously 
or unknowingly, to concede implicitly some pre-modern truth. Certainly, it is 
char acte ris tic of radical atheism that it is in revoit against ail preceding truth both 
modern and pre-modern. Yet, precisely because radical atheism presupposes nihilism, 
it can formulate its ideological content only by the transvaluation of preceding truths 
which it rejects. 
This atheistic transvaluation is occasioned by - and gains its spurious 
plausibility from - the incidence of a multiplicity of inexactitudes and serious errors 
in the history of thought. Admittedly, these errors, both philosophical and theolo-
gical, tend to obscure the truths extant in classical and Judaeo-Christian doctrine. 
Indeed, the errors to be found in pagan antiquity and in the heresies parasitic upon 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition, are commonly prompted by ideological aspirations. 
Nevertheless, to respond to the truths and the errors in the history of thought by way 
of a systematic transvaluation is to offer a response which is fundamentally 
irrational. Its outcome is the more or less definitive aggravation of the partial 
ideological distortions which occurred in preceding thought. 
What 1 am suggesting is that the most important controversy in the twentieth 
century is the comprehensive controversy between modern atheism in its most 
explicit and self-conscious forms and the classical/Judaeo-Christian teaching, found 
pre-eminently and specifically in Thomism. 12 Evidently this controversy will concern 
the real import of the entire history of pagan, Judaeo-Christian and modernist 
thought. Certainly, there is operative in history a recurring series of attempts to 
suppress, and ta revoit against, the perennial truth of reason and faith. Since this 
perennial truth - which is available, at least in its essentials, and demands to be 
Il. On scientism, cf. J. WHLMUTH: The Nature and Origins of Scientism, Milwaukee, 1944; on ideology, 
cf. MARn~, op. cit. 
12. MlDGLè.Y: "Concerning the Modernist Subversion of Political Philosophy", The New Scholasticism, 
Spring 1979, pages 168-190. 
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rightly maintained from the beginning to the end ofhuman life on earth - cannot be 
refuted or really eliminated, no ideological enterprise can ever avoid conceding -
however implicitly or unknowingly - that there is a permanent truth which it seeks 
to suppress and against which it seeks to revoit. Moreover, every ideological 
enterprise will seek to suppress that truth which it somehow admits, and to revoit 
against it, under the three aspects of anticipatory ideology, heretical ideology, and 
atheistic ideology. 
The ideological suppression and revoit is always, in view of human ignorance, to 
sorne extent anticipatory. The human wayfarer's rejection of truth consists in sorne 
sort of pre-disposition towards a kind of irreparable estrangement from the divine 
truth which is not finally consummated in this life. Yet, if the ideological suppression 
and revoit is always, in sorne sense, anticipatory, it is also al ways, in sorne sense, 
heretical. Since there is sufficient promulgation of the truth of faith, the error of the 
one who has been offered the beginnings of the truth of at least indispensable faith 
but has partially suppressed and revolted against them, is a kind of heresy. Finally, 
the ideological suppression and revoit is al ways in sorne sense and to sorne extent 
atheistic. Sinee the intentional rejection of divine truth by man is a kind of rejection 
of God which proeeeds, in sorne way or other, as if God did not exist, the rejection is 
always at least potentially atheistic. 
Although the three aspects of the ideological suppression and revoit are always 
simultaneously present, one or other of these aspects will tend to predominate in the 
case of a particular age, a particular people, culture or group, or even in the case of a 
particular human individu al. Which aspect will tend to predominate will depend 
upon the degree of fullness with which the fundamental and divine truth happens to 
be actually available in the particular context and circumstances. 
The greatest classical philosophers admitted that there is sorne kind of divine or 
eternal order and even the polytheistic cultures of pagan antiquity bore witness that 
man is a religious animal. Nevertheless, in pagan antiquity, there is an endemic 
weakness and mediocrity which occasion a kind of resistance to the perfection of the 
philosophy of the eternal order and to the true divine revelation. This resistance 
consists in a prirnarily anticipatory ideological distortion of truth which pre-figures 
that subsequent ideological thinking which is at first primarily heretical and then 
primarily atheistic. 
Ideological thinking immediately parasitic upon the Judaeo-Christian tradition 
is primarily heretical. Although the Christian heresies do not normally reject 
formally the very idea of a public objective divine reve1ation, they inevitably 
undermine that idea. For example, the Lutheran revoit against the economies of the 
eternal law is an important precursor of those ideologies which define themselves as 
post-Christian. However, the heretical revoit against the eternal order did not reach 
its climax in traditional Protestantisrn. The subsequent Enlightenment occasioned 
not only rationalistic theology but also a reaction against rationalism in the form of a 
traditionalistic theological ideology which rejected reason and found itself unable to 
connect its own notion of "faith" to the eternal truth. In the context of theological 
liberalism, the incipient relativism of this traditionalistic theological ideology led to 
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collusion with that emerging theological modernism which Pius X subsequently 
characterized as the compendium of aIl the heresies. 13 This compendium is evidently 
vulnerable to further transvaluation into explicitly atheistic ideology. 
Ideology which is primarily atheistic does not simply react unfavourably to the 
first promulgations of fundamental and divine truth ; it does not simply distort the 
truth which has been received; it rather seeks to "overcome" fundamental truth, 
both natural and revealed, and to surpass it altogether. In doing so, modern atheism 
undertakes a research into the truths and ideological errors which subsist in pagan 
antiquity and in the Christian centuries. This is no mere academic interest in the 
history of ideas or in anthropological facts. Modern atheism has an ideological 
concern to ignore and, at the same time, to disparage the fundamental truths 
fragmentarily affirmed in former times. Such truths are regarded as no better than 
the anticipatory and heretical ideologies with which preceding cultures were conta-
minated. Concentrating upon the negative and ideological features - and assimi-
lating to them the whole of preceding thought - atheistic ideology daims that 
dassical philosophy was only an ideology, that pagan man was, in effect, not a 
religious animal, and that monotheism, naturallaw and Judaeo-Christian revelation 
have neither a truly rational basis nor a truly divine origin but are to be understood in 
relation to historÏcal terres trial conflicts amongst non-rational forces. 
IV. A THEISTIC TRANSVALUA TION IN NIETZSCHE AND MARX 
The modernist transvaluations from MachiaveIli to Rousseau were subsequently 
developed by many later thinkers - and especially by Kant, Hegel and Feuerbach. In 
The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach undertakes a radical systematic transvaluation 
of the Thomist doctrine on universals and on existence and essence. In the Stuttgart 
(1903) edition of his work, there are the explicit references to the relevant texts of 
St. Thomas in the Summa theologiae and the Summa contra Genti/es. 14 Feuerbach 
falsely assimila tes ail human knowledge of nature and of God to human knowledge 
of the human self. He therefore erroneously attributes the properties of sub-human 
nature and of God Himself to the human self. Man is identified as the infinite being, 
the creator of the universe, and he is also identified with the whole of that sub-
rational nature of which he has knowledge. 
After many adventures, the entire modernist enterprise enters into a more 
radical phase in Nietzsche 15 and Marx. In Marx's "scientistic" teaching on the 
"naturalization of man", there is a conspÏcuous debt to the "substitute intelligence of 
nature". In Nietzsche, the "substitute intelligence of the superman" is obviously 
prominent. But, in each case, scientism and ideology are employed in an atheistic 
synthesis of both the two types of substitute intelligence. In Nietzsche, there is not 
13. Lamennais traversed the subterranean connection between the heresies of traditionalism and 
modernism. Following the rejection of his teaching by Gregory XVI, the entire system of theological 
Modernism was exactly condemned by Pius X in his encyclical Paseendi (1907). 
14. Cf. the important discussion in McCoy, op. cil., chapter IX. 
15. Leo STRAUSS: "The Three Waves of Modernity", in Po/itical Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss, 
ed. Gildin, Indianapolis, 1975. Also cf. MIDGLEY: "Natural Law and Fundamental Rights", op. ciro 
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only the purported usurpation of the divine prerogatives in the emergence of the 
Nietzschean superman, there is also his denial of the human soul and his bizarre 
exultation in man's animal body.'6 And, in Marx, there is an aspiration to the 
substitute intelligence of those supposedly "unalienated" supermen who are imagined, 
in the final state, to people his "socialized humanity", 
Both Nietzsche and Marx undertake a transvaluation which systematically 
misrepresents and seeks to "overcome" radically the difficulties of the human 
condition. They begin to suppress and purport to "overcome" the difficulty in man's 
relations with God by proclaiming the death of God. They start to "overcome" the 
difficulty in man's relations with other men by denying the presence of any natural 
socio-political inclination in human nature. Finally, they purport to "overcome" the 
difficulty in man's relations with the lower creation by deposing man, in one way or 
another, from his natural ascendancy over the lower creation. 
Ali these false steps are occasioned by a radical modernist misunderstanding and 
misrepresentation of the weaknesses of human nature consequent upon original sin. 
In fact, however, since original sin does not give rise to a fundamental ontological 
disorder in human nature, man remains subject to natural and divine law in his 
relations with God, with other men, and with the lower creation. Over against the 
N ietzschean and Marxian transvaluations of the last of these three relations, there is 
the teaching of Pius XII that "Original sin and its consequences have not deprived 
man of his lordship over the earth but of his security in the exercise of that 
lordship," 17 
In propounding their own far-reaching daims and their comprehensive quarrel 
with preceding thought, Nietzsche and Marx cannot sim ply rest content with any 
earlier scientism and ideology extracted from the anticipatory or heretical moments 
of human thought or from the more immediate modernist precursors of their own 
teachings. Nietzsche and Marx both envisage the "overcoming" of the bondage of ail 
preceding transvaluations - a consummation of, and a deliverance from, the entire 
history of modernity. Although nihilistic atheism's scientism and ideology must 
obtain a content by ransacking the de bris of preceding thought, Nietzsche and Marx 
purport to "overcome" this inescapable edecticism. They seek to bring scientism and 
ideology not only to a point of crisis but to a kind of consummation which surpasses 
every preceding scientism and ideology. 
In developing their perspectives upon the past and the future, Nietzsche and 
Marx undertake retrospective - or even apparently retro-active - evaluations of the 
ideological significance of the pasto Each seeks to envelop and to surpass all 
preceding thought [both true and false] on the basis of a pseudo-transcendent 
opposition to the eternal order. Marx's thought is usually more opaque than 
Nietzsche's. On the whole, Marx provides the more plausible synthesis. Despite the 
duplicity of Nietzsche, his self-exposure enables the perceptive reader to recognize 
more readily the actual process of atheistic transvaluation. Yet, even amid the 
comparative obscurity of Marx's reactions to the eternal order, it is obvious that his 
16. C.R. JETTE: The Philosophy of Nietzsche in the Light of Thomistic Princip/es, New York, 1967. 
17. PIUS XII: Christmas Allocution, 1956. 
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thought gives ri se to a number of definite confrontations. There is a juxtaposition 
between the Thomist proof from contingency for the existence of God and Marx's 
refusai to take any pro of seriously because he resents irrationally the contingency of 
human existence. Marx will not be satisfied unless and until man possesses that 
fundamentally independent existence 18 which true theology can attribute only to the 
one necessary being, namely, God. Again, there is a confrontation between the 
eternallaw (expounded by Thomism) which governs the world and that commitment 
to the total re-writing of the history of the world whereby Marx decides that socialist 
man shall suppress the question as to how man eould begin to create man before he 
had come into existence. 19 In envisaging the deliverance of man from a supposed 
state of [ontologieally] alienated existence [which could not really oecur because it is 
ontologically self-contradictory] by means of "practical-critical activity", Marx 
purports, in effect, to seeure that the substitute intelligence of the superman shall 
somehow coincide (or become identified) with the finally emergent substitute 
intelligence of nature. 
With such considerations in mind, McCoy seems to have considered that the 
Marxian ideology was the most significant culmination of the entire intellectual 
enter prise of a misguided modernity. On the other hand, even Marx could not perfect 
his synthesis and, since history continued after his death, his atheistic successors are 
!eft to multiply the number of atheistic ideologies based on the two substitute 
intelligences taken either separate1y or together in sorne synthesis whether post-
Marxian, post-Nietzschean or otherwise. Ali su ch ideologies are necessarily unsound 
for the fundamental reasons we have already considered. 
V. LIBERATIONIST IDEOLOGIES OF MODERN ATHEISM 
The Iiberationist ideologies of more recent atheism do not envisage either a 
spiritual liberation of man or even an authentic socio-politicalliberation on the basis 
of natural law. They are founded upon a paradox. The eclecticism of preceding 
atheistic ideology is seriously aggravated. At the same time, the drive towards 
ideological unit y is powerfully intensified. Marcel Clément has referred to these notes 
of eclecticism and convergence as follows: 20 
"Rousseau dreamed of a political, Marx of an economic, and Freud of a sexual 
Iiberation. Ali of them (but each in his own way) attack religion ... the evolution 
of these doctrines is reaching its end. Though they were opposed to each other a 
short time ago, they now tend to commingle in a system ... the system may be 
multiform, but in its basic inspiration it is unified: the rejection of human nature 
defined as dependent on an order established by the Creator in the physical, 
moral, personal and social structure of man ... " 
Referring to the ideological aspiration towards "totalliberation", Clément points out 
that: 
18. MARX: Economie and Philosophie Manuscripts of 1844. 
19. E. VOEGHI!\: Science, Politics and Gnosticism, Chicago, 1968, pages 23-26. 
20. CI.F.MF!\T: Christ and Revolution, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1974. 
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"The liberation at stake here is, most explicitly, not a social but an ontological 
liberation ... Man wishes to abolish human subordination ... because it reflects 
and expresses man's ontological dependence on God". 
The attempt to produce a unified atheistic ideology of liberation faces the 
difficulty that the Marxism of Marx looks forward to the elimination of alienation as 
the eventual out come of the revolution. It seems essential even to the superficial 
plausibility of the Marxian doctrine that there should be sorne specifie possible way 
of overcoming alienation. Maurice Clavel 21 has analyzed the consequences of the 
current abandonment of a specifically Marxian view both of the final state and of the 
means 10 the elimination of alienation - by those who have sought to combine 
Marxism with other types of atheistic ideology. 
Very evidently, the Marxian element in Max Weber's ideology of value is 
severely truncated. The adoption of Marxism in an existentialist perspective, by 
Sartre and others, involved the loss of the specifically Marxian doctrine of alienation. 
The same can be said of the attempt of Marcuse and others to reconcile Marx and 
Freud in the light of a certain dependence on Nietzsche. The incorporation of 
Marxism as an element in the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss is an important example 
of the sa me phenomenon. By comparison with the evident non-humanism of 
pastiches such as structuralism, Clavel will concede that the Marxism of Marx might 
be regarded as a kind of humanism because Marx holds that man will eventually 
come to exist at the end of historical times. 22 However, since the work of the "man" 
who has not yet arrived cannot really create the "man" who is suppose to exist in the 
future, the Marxian pseudo-humanism do es not constitute a sufficient intellectual 
obstacle to the advent of non-humanism. 
More generally, Michel Foucault has explored, as a student of the history of 
ideas, the problematic endemic in modern thought arising from the attempt to cope 
with an "empirical-positivist" and an [entirely secularized and transvalued] "eschato-
logical" type of knowledgeY Foucault has concluded that, in spite of the supposedly 
heroic efforts of Nietzsche to achieve an atheistic manifestation of man, the outcome 
of the thought of modernity is the non-existence of man. Accordingly, the admitted 
non-humanism of structuralism sim ply illustrates without prevarication what has 
been implicit in radical atheistic ideology from the beginning. In Foucault's view, 
what is crucial is not sim ply that modern thought has never been able to propound an 
intellectually viable morality but also the fact that the atheistic "demolition" of God 
has led inexorably to the disappearance of man. 24 This logical consequence of 
atheism was entire1y predictable in advance on the basis of Thomist teaching. 
VI. BIOLOGICAL IDEOLOGIES OF MODERN A THEISM 
Like the liberationist Ideologies, the biological and ecological Ideologies of 
modern atheism manifest the notes of eclecticism and convergence. Let us begin to 
21. CLAVEL: QUI est aliéné? Critique et Métaphysique Sociale de l'Occident, Paris, 1970. 
22. Ihid.. page 22. 
n. FOUCAULT: The Order of Things, London, 1970, especially pages 305-343. 
24. FoucAm T, op. cit., and also his The Archeology of Knowledge, London, 1972, page 211. 
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indicate the parameters of these ideologies by first taking the doctrine of Konrad 
Lorenz. Lorenz upholds an erroneous neo-Oarwinian long-term evolutionary pers-
pective upon the past and future ofman. 25 Nevertheless, within the kind oftime-scale 
normally considered in studies of man's socio-political relationships, Lorenz holds 
for the comparative stability of man's basic instinctive drives. He opposes other 
biological ideologies which minimize the specifie character of man's natural incli-
nations just as he rejects Kant's abstraction of man's real noumenal self from the 
inclinations of human nature. In the face of certain tendencies towards non-
humanism, then, Lorenz upholds a kind of pseudo-humanism. 
Certainly, Lorenz attributes to man a substitute intelligence of nature formu-
lated in a scientistic doctrine extrapolated from non-human animal behaviour. 
Lorenz propounds an anal ogy between culturally ritualized behaviour patterns in 
man and phyletically ritualized behaviour patterns both in man and in certain 
animaIs. He also holds that culturally ritualized behaviour patterns at their best are 
functionally analogous to what he understands as human morality. 
Having postulated a substitute intelligence of nature in man, Lorenz is in 
difficulties in defining the role of reason in its precarious relationship with man's 
bodily appetites. He tends to lay the blame upon a supposed deficiency in the 
structure of man's biological behaviour patterns as compared with those of non-
rational animaIs. Also he not only rejects the bogus "pure reason" of Kant but also 
denies that human reason can coherently direct and govern man's natural inclinations 
in a way which does justice both to man's biological nature and to his reason. Whilst 
rejecting the Kantian dualism and whilst seeking to re-attach the Kantian "thing-in-
itself" to man's natural inclinations,26 Lorenz nevertheless fails to formulate an 
adequate philosophical account of human nature. Like Freud and others, he regards 
man as a jeopardized being who se nature is fundamentally out of order.27 
Lorenz admits that he does not know the function of either human culture or 
morality. He seems to assume that their function is, in sorne sense, survival and he 
postulates man as a "systemic whole" embracing biological, cultural and rational/ 
moral factors. 28 Since this systemic who le cannot be properly ordered, man's reason 
is considered as both subject to his biological drives and also as autonomous. The 
element of autonomy is expounded by Lorenz in Nietzschean terms. Lorenz 
envisages man as adopting a series of [ideological] masks which are apparently meant 
to liberate modern man but which are found eventually (Lorenz admits) to enslave 
him. In agreement with Nietzsche, Lorenz considers thought as at first like hot liquid 
lava and then, subsequently, as solidifying and building a castle around itself. Every 
such thought is supposed finally to crush itself with "laws".29 So autonomous man 
chooses to replace one [ideological] thought with another [equally ideological] one. 
25. On the need to distinguish properly between biological science and biophilosophy, cf. E. GILSON: 
D'Aristote à Darwin et Retour, Paris, 1971. 
26. LORI.NZ: "Kant', Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology", General Systems 
(Society for General Systems Research), vol. VII, 1962, pages 23-35. 
27. LORE~z: Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour, vol. 2, London, 1971, pages 178, 181 and 195; 
cf. also his On Af:gression, London, 1967, page 205. 
28. On Aggression. op. cit., page 219. 
29. "Kant', Doctrine of the A Priori in the Light of Contemporary Biology", op. cit. 
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Evidently, Lorenz has sought to complement his scientistic ideology (based on a 
substitute intelligence of nature) with another ideological aspiration (a substitute 
intelligence of the superman) apparently more effectuai for the changing of man 's 
behaviour patterns. The outcome of this pastiche of substitute intelligences is, for 
Lorenz as for Freud, open to doubt. Certainly, a number of other ideologists reject 
the teaching of Lorenz. JO Specifically, they den y Lorenz's view that there is in man an 
innate instinct of aggression. More generally, they adopt an ambiguous attitude 
towards the ontological contradictions in Lorenz's pseudo-humanism. Although they 
do not accept his account of the juxtaposition of the biological, cultural and moral 
elements in man, they do not advance any philosophical basis for the unit y of man's 
nature and operations. 
In response to Lorenz, these opponents simply envisage - in substitution for 
man as he really is - an alternative system of human elements which lack stable 
natural characteristics and are represented as more or less indefinitely plastic. 
Accordingly, the ideological opponents of Lorenz postulate - instead of man - an 
"entity" which is so insubstantial and incoherent that it could hardly be even 
imagined to be capable of existing. Over against Lorenz's pseudo-humanism, they 
apparently tend towards a non-humanism. The substitute intelligence of the super-
man is stressed at the expense of the substitute intelligence of nature. 
Within the primarily atheistic parameters of these diverse biological ideologies, 
the prominent ecological ideologies do not manifest a legitimate concern for the 
human environment on the basis of natural law. These ideologies are variously 
classified: 31 as "conservative" or "utopian"; as supposedly "scientific" or appa-
rently "anti-scientific"; as an ecological "individualisrn" or an ecological "totali-
tarianism"; as adrnittedly rnaterialist or apparently involved in sorne kind of 
"mystical" or "spiritual" approach to nature. Aiso there seerns to be a disagreernent 
- at least a difference of emphasis - between those pseudo-hurnanists who are 
prirnarily concerned with a certain conception of hum an survival and those non-
humanists prirnarily preoccupied with a certain conception of the survival of the 
global eco-system. Without seeking to deny that rneanings can be attached to 
distinctions of these kinds, it must be rernembered that ail these primarily atheistic 
ideologies are variants belonging to the sarne ideological spectrurn. 
Already in Hobbes and in Rousseau, we find potentially atheistic syntheses of an 
erroneous individualisrn with an erroneous totalitarianism. 32 Rousseau is also one of 
the ideological precursors of the socio-political doctrines 33 of both "conservative" 
30. Ashley Montagu (ed.): Man and Aggression, 2nd ed., London, 1973. Cf. al 50 MIDGLEY: "Natural 
Law and the Renewal of the Philosophy of International Relations (IV: Aggression and the Biological 
Ideologies) Year Book of World AfTairs, vol. 29, 1975, pages 121-136. 
31. MIDGLEY: "Traditionalism and Modernism in Ecological and Liberationist Ideology", Catholic 
Social Review, vol. VI, Trinit y 1977, pages 13-30. 
32. E.J. ROESC'H: The Totalitarian Threat: The Fruition of Modern Individualism, as seen in Hobbes and 
Rousseau, New York, 1963. 
33. For example, at least indirect influence of Rousseau seems apparent in the discussion of "self-
regulating" socicties in Appendix B to E. GOLDSMIl H, R. ALLEN and others: A Blueprint for Survival, 
Harmondswonh, 1973. 
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and "utopian" ecologists. The supposedly "scientific" ecological ideologies of 
atheism are based, at a crucial point, not upon science but on a scientism inseparably 
connected with a more substantive ideology. Those other atheistic ideologists, led by 
antagonism towards technological pollution to adopt an anti-scientific posture, do 
not thereby become philosophers; they remain radical ideologists. 
Those ecological ideologies which employ a pseudo-mysticism are, in their 
essential orientation, no less atheistic in character than those which are openly 
materialist. In T. Roszak 34 and others, we encounter a pseudo-mysticism which is 
tantamount ta a revoit against religion. It is of the same generic character as the 
pseudo-mysticism of Rousseau and the "mystical allure" which surrounds the 
basically anti-religious doctrine of Hegel. Similarly, F. Fraser Darling's ideology 35 -
derived mainly by illicit extrapolation from, and distortion of, results drawn from the 
special sciences - grounds its claim to be "holistic" partly upon a basically atheistic 
transvaluation of religion. 
We have se en that orthodox Marxism - despite its fundamental errors -' 
retains a superficial plausibility to the extent that it envisages the decisive "over·· 
coming" of the human alienation which it has postulated. This "overcoming" of 
alienation seems to involve sorne kind of more or less decisive "overcoming" of 
scarcity. ln so far as ecological ideologies do not look to any decisive overcoming of 
scarcity, they are more realistic about the human condition but, in another respect, 
less coherent as atheistic ideologies. In so far as ecological ideology - whether 
pseudo-humanist or non-humanist - seriously endeavours to achieve a synthesis, it 
will employ the two substitute intelligences. Employing the substitute intelligence of 
the superman, it will seek to undertake sorne kind of ideological prise en conscience 
whereby the supposed primitive ecological balances (founded upon the substitute 
intelligence of nature) are to be somehow both restored and consummated though 
never decisively perfected. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have seen that modern atheism cannot find in its liberationist and 
biologicallecological ideologies any solid foundation for an intellectual synthesis. 
These various ideologies sometimes presuppose a false concept of human nature as 
ontologically flawed, dislocated and self-contradictory. Sometimes they postulate a 
concept of human nature as almost indefinitely plastic and indeterminate. Very 
generally, these ideologies tend to lead, either implicitly or explicitly, to the 
conclusion that man has no ontological reality at aIl. These pseudo-humanisms and 
non-humanisms obtain their ideological content by the transvaluation of previous 
modernist and pre-modern teachings, both sacred and profane. In each case, the 
atheistic premises render an objective intellectual synthesis impossible. 
34. ROSZAK: "Ecology and Mysticism", Humanist, 86: 5, May 1971, pages 134-136. 
35. Fraser DARU>lC;: "Man's Responsibility for the Environment", in Ebling (ed.l: Bi%gy and Ethics, 
London, 1969, pages 117-122. 
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Modern atheistic ideology advances beyond the ambiguous modernist concept 
of "social engineering" to the more radically ideological enterprise of a more explicit 
"ontological engineering". In certain cases, the nihilistic or relativizing principle is 
dominant and the "ontological engineering" is envisaged as piecemeal, eclectic and 
ambivalent. This bringing together of re1ativized elements from originally incom-
patible atheistic ideologies does not deprive the pastiche of its radically ideological 
character, although it may sometimes reduce its ideological thrust or effectiveness. 
In other cases, there is a dominant se arch for a unified ideological synthesis of 
the two substitute intelligences which advances an "ontological engineering" which is 
drastic, quasi-dogmatic and global in character. Finally, we encounter (especially in 
recent ideologies of "totalliberation") the attempt to make the re\ativizing principle 
and the principle of unification equally and jointly dominant. This lat est undertaking 
reveals yet again the fruitless conjunction of the fundamental errors endemic in the 
entire history of the ideological revoit of modern atheism. 
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